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Abstract
Fittingly, Rage For Order by Lauren Benton, Professor of Law and History at Vanderbilt University, and Lisa
Ford, Associate Professor of History at the University of New South Wales, takes both its title and its epigraph
from the last stanza of Wallace Stevens’ “The Idea of Order at Key West.” Originally written on the then-
sparsely inhabited island of Key West in Florida, the poem blends the sound of a woman singing with the
ocean and uses that voice to delineate the various boundaries between wave, sky, and horizon line. Beginning
with the stanza quoted above, Stevens ends up identifying the ocean with that voice, and describes the singer
as the one who creates that ocean with her singing, before he then describes our “rage” for order. Put another
way, Stevens writes a poem about how man—or woman!—is the one who orders the natural world,
delineating with light and sound the various zones and poles of the ocean. It is a fitting epigraph precisely
because the project of empire and international law both are similar attempts by humankind to order the
world. For this book, however, the key word in the poem is, of course, rage: rage as a thoughtless, uncontrolled
passion; rage as a deeply damaging action; rage as a fashionable craze. All three understandings of rage have
their place in the narrative of empire spun by Benton and Ford.
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Book Review
Rage for Order: The British Empire and 
the Origins of International Law 1800–
1850 by Lauren Benton & Lisa Ford1
SAM ZUCCHI2
…Then we,
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.
—Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key West”
FITTINGLY, RAGE FOR ORDER by Lauren Benton, Professor of Law and History 
at Vanderbilt University, and Lisa Ford, Associate Professor of History at the 
University of New South Wales, takes both its title and its epigraph from the last 
stanza of Wallace Stevens’ “The Idea of Order at Key West.” Originally written 
on the then-sparsely inhabited island of Key West in Florida, the poem blends 
the sound of a woman singing with the ocean and uses that voice to delineate 
the various boundaries between wave, sky, and horizon line. Beginning with the 
stanza quoted above, Stevens ends up identifying the ocean with that voice, and 
describes the singer as the one who creates that ocean with her singing, before he 
then describes our “rage” for order. Put another way, Stevens writes a poem about 
1. Lauren Benton & Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of 
International Law 1800-1850 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2016).
2. JD Candidate 2018, Osgoode Hall Law School.
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how man—or woman!—is the one who orders the natural world, delineating with 
light and sound the various zones and poles of the ocean. It is a fitting epigraph 
precisely because the project of empire and international law both are similar 
attempts by humankind to order the world. For this book, however, the key word 
in the poem is, of course, rage: rage as a thoughtless, uncontrolled passion; rage as 
a deeply damaging action; rage as a fashionable craze. All three understandings of 
rage have their place in the narrative of empire spun by Benton and Ford.
Rage for Order takes for its subject matter the British Empire in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, and argues that the various expansionist projects it 
undertook laid the groundwork for what would, eventually, become international 
law. Broadly speaking, Benton and Ford argue this expansionist project, while 
often haphazard, inconsistent, and more often than not merely driven by 
opportunistic or enterprising individuals in widely different colonial regions, 
nevertheless served to extend the power of the centre over various peripheral 
regions. In making this argument, the various chapters take after their subject 
empire and span the globe: thirty pages may cover investigative commissions 
in Australia3 before switching focus to a similar commission in the Caribbean; 
state ordering in Polynesia is presented in parallel with British interference with 
the Rio de la Plata. Yet what saves this argument from becoming a rote series 
of anecdotes—“How are commissions in x and y the same? Well…”—is the 
recurrence of two themes.
The first is the notion of ‘middle power’—the idea that various agents of the 
Crown could effectively wield executive authority to temper tyranny that might 
“creep from the peripheries to the center.”4 The authors borrow this term from 
one of their subjects, Thomas Maitland—more on him later—to describe the 
specific nature of the authority held by governors and other representatives of the 
authority of London. Faith in the notion of middle power was held not only by 
those who wielded it: given that slavery was viewed as the most iconic form of 
despotism, abolitionists embraced the use of middle power as a way of limiting the 
cruelty of local masters and, eventually, outlawing the institution entirely. These 
goals dovetailed with those of colonial governors, who viewed the imposition of 
a uniform and imperial standard as a way of bringing local autonomy—often, 
again, represented in the form of the despotic slaveholder—to heel.
3. Indeed, in a reflection of what may simply be a familiarity with local history on the part of 
one author—Australia and New South Wales specifically—is given more attention than any 
other part of the world.
4. Benton & Ford, supra note 1 at 7. The term is the label given to states that, despite not being 
superpowers, nevertheless have enough power to have some impact on world affairs.
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The second theme is the vernacular constitution. Here, Rage for Order engages 
more with the secondary literature surrounding constitution building in the early 
nineteenth century: the issue of constitutionalism in the early nineteenth century 
has seen a great deal of critical attention, though usually with regards to that 
of the then-nascent United States of America, or the various constitutions that 
sprouted in the wake of the South American wars of independence. Benton and 
Ford both note that the British constitution in the early nineteenth century has 
not received the same degree of attention, even as discussions primarily focused 
on American constitutionalism often invoke comparisons to British efforts in the 
same period.5 Colonial efforts at articulating this constitution—and the rights 
of British subjects—were tied to the same concerns with despotism that middle 
power sought to address. Hence the project of creating a legal code that would be 
simultaneously flexible, yet familiar enough, to create order throughout the British 
Empire. Various commissions and bodies of review—which all had “strategic 
deference to the principle that colonies should not adopt laws repugnant to the 
laws of England”6—sought to simultaneously harmonize the various cultural 
and inherited legal codes of different colonies with an unwritten constitution. 
The result was an often-conflicting hodgepodge that simultaneously reflected 
the empire as a whole and the particulars of each individual colony with their 
place in the empire:
Canada, New South Wales, and the Cape shared constitutional space with India, 
Ceylon, and Sierra Leone, not because race did not matter or because the colonies 
were deemed equivalent, but because imperial law talk was flexible enough to be 
inclusive without aspiring to universalism.7
Much of the narrative of these constitutional explorations is concerned with 
detailed specifics, for example, the formulation of legal codes in modern-day 
Sri Lanka, with treaties between the empire and various Indonesian sovereigns, 
or the reports of various commissioners across the Empire. The articulations of 
these legal instruments, despite their diversity, were representative of the informal 
and confused way in which the empire established a legal order across the globe.
Rage for Order then positions itself as outlining the middle ground between the 
revolutions of the late eighteenth-century and the international order that emerged 
a century later. Equal parts revisionist history and ground-breaking research, the 
book’s diversity of subject matter and locations serves as a good response to what 
5. See e.g. Lauren Benton, “Constitutions and Empires” (2006) 31:1 Law & Soc 
Inquiry 177 at 194.
6. Benton & Ford, supra note 1 at 13
7. Ibid at 17.
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Benton has elsewhere described as a critique of imperial historiography in this 
period: “imperial legal culture … has been pursued unevenly, often limited by 
attention to one locale or by a privileging of elite pronouncements over a broader 
and more diffuse arena of political discourse.”8 Or, as Benton and Ford put it in 
this book, “[i]t is perhaps deeply unfashionable to seek to recover the juridical 
thought of low- and mid-level bureaucrats and their antagonists and allies in the 
colonies,”9 but it is the juridical thought embedded in nitty-gritty details of law 
commission reports, letters, and pamphlets that percolated into justifications for 
colonial intervention and legal reform. In delving into dry commission reports 
and salacious correspondence from far-flung corners of the globe, Benton and 
Ford attempt to fill in the gaps piecemeal, as with a mosaic: John Canning’s 
search for sovereigns in modern-day Indonesia, for example, or the conflict with 
the Kingdom of Tahiti over the killing of a few sailors are, individually, minor 
events in this period, yet Benton and Ford convincingly argue that they represent 
important moments in the extension of British power. The picture these kinds of 
arguments ultimately paint is a messy one not merely in terms of geography, but 
in terms of source material—for every dry commission report, there is a salacious 
correspondence; for every familiar report of colonial conquest, there are bizarre 
stories like that of James Brooke, who kept deceiving his way up the chain of 
command in Southeast Asia. Indeed, at times the combinations can sound like 
comical trivia questions—“What does the Kingdom of Kandy have to do with 
the Ionian Islands? Keep reading to find out!”—yet these diffuse areas of discourse 
serve to strengthen the book’s argument regarding the hub’s ultimate extension of 
power over the periphery. Beyond that point, the variety of narratives make for 
an entertaining read.
Yet even as Benton and Ford explore new avenues of research, they also seek 
to upend conventional wisdom regarding the origins of international law. For 
example, the authors engage with the argument that “British efforts to enforce 
global prohibitions—in particular, a ban on piracy and the slave trade—[served 
as] the origins of powerful international norms, including the seeds of human 
rights law.”10 But instead of accepting that the roots of these prohibitions lay in 
nascent understandings of crimes against humanity or an international policing 
8. Benton, supra note 5 at 180. Put another way, the sources relied on in Rage for Order serve as 
a presumptive affirmative answer to the question posed in the title of an essay by Hazel Fox. 
See Hazel Fox, “Peremptory Norms: Is There a Need for New Sources of International Law?” 
cited in Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Maria Vogiatzi, eds, Time, History and 
International Law (Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at 119.
9. Benton & Ford, supra note 1 at 10.
10. Ibid at 20.
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regime, Benton and Ford argue that “bilateral treaties created a series of permissive 
spaces for imperial enforcement that relied on British municipal law and modified 
prize law, and produced a patchy regulatory regime.”11 This reimagining of the 
roots of international human rights law fits neatly with the jumbled-up quality 
of the various legal developments described in the book: abolitionists like James 
Stephen relied upon the codification of legal systems in various slave colonies 
as a way of protecting slaves because it was the most expedient way to limit 
the petty despotism of their masters; or the regulation of piracy in Indonesia 
took the form of a uniform ordering of different kinds of power and statehood 
unfamiliar to European eyes. In a word, the foundation of international law was 
often thoughtlessly slapdash, rendered into a legal form—more often than not by 
non-lawyers—to meet the needs of the moment and later passing into precedent. 
Yet, looking backwards, a pattern does emerge in the themes of constitutionalism 
and middle power.
Chapter Four—“The Promise of Protection”—is particularly illustrative 
of the way Benton and Ford’s argument operates. First, the term “protection” 
is introduced as a term that encapsulated shifting ideas of Crown authority and 
individual autonomy, depending on either definition’s expediency:
‘Protection’ came to mean both the protection of the Crown, as extended to 
especially vulnerable groups of subjects or to all subjects, and protection from the 
exercise of arbitrary power—even by those authorized to act for the Crown.12
These contradictory definitions are then introduced in two very different 
instances: the former served as the legal justification for the annexation of the 
Kingdom of Kandy (modern day Sri Lanka); the latter circumscribed British 
control of the Ionian Islands and its inhabitants.
In Kandy, the language of protection—first, protection of the Kandyan 
King’s person, and then of the common people—was used by the first British 
governor to justify the attempted imposition of a British garrison on the interior 
of the island. In slight contrast, Thomas Maitland, the second governor, sought to 
emphasize a more legalistic formulation of protection that relied on an extension 
of executive power. This would be accomplished in two ways: first, through 
“a suite of measures to strengthen the authority of midlevel judges and to extend 
the reach of executive authority to the local level”;13 second, through “a strong 
11. Ibid. For the authors’ discussion of the specifics of anti-piracy and anti-slave trade measures 
during this period, see Ibid, ch 5.
12. Ibid at 87.
13. Ibid at 94.
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hand for the governor,”14 that could, if necessary, overrule the chief justice of 
the local judiciary. The first avenue represents the theme of middle power that 
runs through Rage for Order; the latter was crushed by London, with supervisory 
powers over the courts being given to the chief justice of the colony. Nevertheless,
Maitland argued that the situation with Kandy called for a combination of legal 
strategies, dependent on the actions of a strong governor. He begged for power 
to respond to Kandyan provocations unfettered by “fixed and invariable rules” 
and advocated a project of legal ethnography in coastal territories and in Kandy—
gathering information that might lead to a “code of customary laws” that would 
underpin the extension of British authority throughout the island.15
Maitland’s successor, Robert Brownrigg, would oversee such an extension of 
British authority by merging these two themes—the impression of an impartial 
system of justice and the rhetoric of protection—by manufacturing a casus belli 
against the King in the name of the oppressed Kandyan subjects. At the outset 
of hostilities, Brownrigg promised to “retain the ‘ranks and dignities’ of the 
chiefs, not to attack the people’s religion, and to preserve ‘their ancient laws and 
institutions.’”16 Helpfully, Maitland had begun the project of codifying these 
laws. Once the interior of the Kingdom was conquered, control was maintained 
by refashioning “protection … as a condition of their submission to British 
troops and not just against the tyrannous king but also ‘against all Foreign and 
Domestic Enemies.’”17
In contrast to its expansive definition on the island of Ceylon, the seven 
Ionian Islands witnessed British attempts to reign in the language of protection 
in order to maximize control while limiting their obligations. These islands 
were awarded to Britain in the 1815 Treaty of Paris not as sovereign possessions 
(as with Malta, or Corfu) but as protectorates, with Britain playing the role 
of “protecting sovereign”18 which led to tension both within the Islands and 
without: Internally, British attempts to extend control led to friction with Greek 
Nationalists; externally, the legal status of alleged Ionian pirates captured by the 
Ottoman Empire led to questions about what kind of protection the British 
Crown owed the Ionian people. Into this simmering conflict enters the very 
same Thomas Maitland, originally as the first governor of Malta after his stint 
in Ceylon ended in 1811. Maitland was posted to the Ionian island with one 
14. Ibid at 95.
15. Ibid at 97.
16. Ibid at 98.
17. Ibid at 99.
18. Ibid at 103.
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mission: “to create an assembly that would in turn design a new constitutional 
charter for ratification.”19 Maitland’s attempt at reformulating the legal system 
of yet another island was, by this point, familiar: it called for a strong executive 
power invested in the High Commissioner who could, if necessary, dictate terms 
to the Islands’ legislative body. This charter was not free from criticism: “Maitland 
had misconstrued protection, according to his critics; he used it as constitutional 
cover for the concentration of power in the executive.”20 Yet this extension of 
British power under the legal codification of protection was hardly unpopular: 
“As in Ceylon, Maitland’s opponents did not get very far; he had the full support 
of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.”21
At once, Maitland oversaw the extension of the constitutionalist project across 
the globe, while expanding his conception of middle power. Further—and this 
is where the authors’ thesis connects with the established body of scholarship—it 
laid the groundwork for the more infamous developments in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Though the “1850 Don Pacifico affair features as a key 
moment when the British government articulated an expansive right to protect 
its subjects anywhere in the world,”22 this affair was the culmination, according 
to Benton and Ford, of the development of the legal notion of protection. 
Despite the disparate forms this development took—protection of the populace 
as justification for invasion and occupation in Ceylon; the internationally agreed 
upon mandate of protection as justification for the imposition of control in the 
Ionian Islands—it represented a flexible imposition of uniformity, of order, across 
the British empire.
But even as the variety of the book’s evidence supports its innovative and 
revisionist argument, it also represents the book’s greatest weakness. Rage for 
Order bases its argument, in part, on illustrative anecdotes which, when taken 
together, attempt to illustrate a general trend. Yet, to borrow an expression from 
the sciences, the plural of anecdote is not data, and the arguments made in Rage 
for Order bear the risk of seeming parochial instead of cohesive. In that vein, the 
book focuses on a relatively limited geographical area: Australia, The Caribbean, 
and the Pacific Ocean are recurrent areas of interest while other areas of the 
world—like Persia or Canada—are mentioned only in passing. India receives 
little attention, despite its importance in the British Empire and the way in 
19. Ibid at 105.
20. Ibid at 109.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 112.
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which it functioned as an “empire by treaty,”23 blending international diplomacy 
and imperial expansion. Indeed, the Indian model might have fit perfectly into 
Benton and Ford’s discussion of state-building—or, to use their terms, “incubating 
states”24—in Chapter Six. Furthermore, the book’s argument from the margins of 
history appears susceptible to arguments from exception: though Rage for Order 
is not meant to be comprehensive in its focus, the potential of the margin lies in 
its novelty, and not in its ability to necessarily overturn all established thought—
especially not when so much of the globe is left unexplored.
Similarly, and as a corollary of its focus on the British Empire, Rage for 
Order ignores both the developments of other empires and the British Empire’s 
interaction with those powers. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, is never 
touched upon, despite the lengthy discussion given to European involvement 
in the Rio de la Plata in Chapter Six. There, Benton and Ford note the ways in 
which Empire was construed as a collection of states both outside and under a 
unifying political umbrella, which helped to set the stage for future inter-state 
legal relationships—but what of the agreements between contemporary empires? 
In part, this limitation reflects the dramatis personae: few of the book’s subjects 
were actual lawyers, and so any discussion of formal legal attitudes or philosophies 
would have, at best, gone over the heads of most characters or, at worst, been 
ignored in favour of expediency.25 Where more legal minds enter the narrative, 
their concerns are focused on the inner workings of the British Empire. European 
involvement in South America is described with little reference to the interplay 
between nations and states, but rather with reference to the British ordering 
of those states:
Polities advanced their interests by proposing that an array of states act together 
as the guardians of commerce. Regional elites, as much as British agents, saw 
advantage in disorganized systems of fractured sovereignty that were loosely joined 
by the recognition of British (and European) power.26
23. See Robert Travers, “A British Empire by Treaty in Eighteenth-Century India” in Saliha 
Belmessous, ed, Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) 132at 132.
24. Benton & Ford, supra note 1 at 175.
25. This unprofessionalism renders inappropriate discussions of legal positivism in some of 
the literature on the origins of international law in the colonies. See e.g. Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 41-65.
26. Benton & Ford, supra note 1 at 178.
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The implication that this arrangement served as a rough progenitor to future 
international legal models is clear, but the emphasis is on the British narrative 
over the European project.
These critiques and caveats are not meant harshly, but rather as an outline of 
the book’s limitations. Nor are they to argue that Rage for Order is simultaneously 
under- and over-inclusive—that it draws too broad a stage while simultaneously 
failing to take into account the bigger picture. It succeeds as a revisionist project 
that tries to use the history of middlemen and margins in order to describe an 
area that has received little attention and to reconsider the received conclusions. 
It further serves as an example of the new directions that academics can explore 
thanks to the increasing digitization of disparate archives of primary sources. In its 
lack of comprehensiveness, Rage for Order serves more as a useful pairing with 
other lines of critical analysis, such as the way in which systems of international 
law replicate the values of the colonizer on the colonized.27 Indeed, to draw one 
last parallel between Rage for Order and its subjects, the book might function 
best as a parallel to Maitland: an influential single example, working in accidental 
and unintentional concert with other small, revisionist works to redefine our 
understanding of the origins of international law and the British Empire.
27. See e.g. Brett Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion and 
the Classical Standard of Civilization” 7:1 (2005) J Hist Int’l L 1; Anghie, supra note 25.

